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Viorel Ursu: An Ambassador's Perspective on Navigating Moldova's Future

Writer's picture: Andrew SmithAndrew Smith

Interview by Andrew Smith


Disclaimer: All interviews reflect the individual views of our guests. This interview has been edited for readability and clarity of speech


Viorel Ursu is the Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the United States and Mexico. As Ambassador at the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affaitrs and European Integration, Ursu represents and promotes the interests of the Republic of Moldova in the international arena, with a focus on strengthening the Euro-Atlantic relations and advancing democracy. Prior to his current role, Ursu was the Division Director at the Open Society Foundations, and worked as a Senior Policy Analyst at the Open Society European Policy Institute in Brussels.


Thank you for joining us, could you begin by walking us through your educational and professional background?


I’m originally from Chișinǎu, the capital of Moldova, and I always wanted to be an accountant, I loved numbers. By chance, when applying to the university, I enrolled into law school. I didn’t know much about law, but joining the law school I got to love law and because I was also passionate about foreign languages, history, and civilizations I particularly got interested in international law, and that’s how I specialized in international rules and diplomacy. I went on to do my masters in European Law and European Studies, and on my return back to Moldova, I taught international law at the same law school I graduated, and many years later I got into the diplomatic service. 


How have you witnessed Moldova-U.S. relations evolve during your tenure as Ambassador? How has the war in Ukraine impacted this evolution? 


I would say that the US-Moldova relations are at their best and strongest right now. Since Moldova’s independence, our relationship has had better times and worse times, but relations really improved over the last 3 years, mostly due to the changes to the government in Moldova. 3 years ago, we relaunched the Strategic Dialogue and the annual meeting between high-level officials that alternates between Chișinǎu and Washington. We also widened the areas of cooperation, adding a fourth pillar to our dialogue: people-to-people contacts. At the beginning of December this year, we announced the launch of negotiations to upgrade our relationship to a Strategic Partnership. 


In what ways do you believe the incoming Trump Administration will impact the U.S.-Moldova relationship?


Our relationship lasted and endured many changes in the government, both in Moldova and in the US. The support for Moldova was always bipartisan, and just last week the Moldovan Foreign Minister and the Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament were visiting Washington, and we spent a lot of time on Capitol Hill, meeting many leaders, including Republican leaders in Congress, to ensure continuous bipartisan support for Moldova. Again, last week leaders of both Republicans and Democrats in Congress made a supportive statement for upgrading the bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership. We hope to finalize the negotiations on the Strategic Partnership Charter under the Trump Administration and sign it next year.  


What role do you believe Moldova has played in European security since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine? Do you believe that it has an elevated responsibility due to its geographic location?


Moldova has been not just a beneficiary of European security, but also a provider. Our military forces have been participating in various peacekeeping operations including under the EU umbrella. Our peacekeeping forces have been in Kosovo for 10 years, in Lebanon, and other African countries. Of course, being so close to the war in Ukraine, the security situation in our region has changed. Moldova has been a strong supporter of Ukraine and condemned  Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. We have also been helping Ukraine, particularly by providing humanitarian aid and assistance, hosting over 130,000 Ukrainian refugees on our territory, and have been helping Ukraine to continue its exports, especially of grain, to the world. 


This year, Maia Sandu, the incumbent Moldovan president who has prioritized a westward shift in the country towards the EU and NATO, defeated pro-Russian candidate Aleksandr Stoianoglo by a margin of just under 11% in the second round of the presidential elections. Do you believe Moldova, given an evident divide in the electorate regarding Russian relations, can take a firmer stance in support of Ukraine and take more tangible steps toward EU/NATO integration without risking internal instability or garnering greater ire from Russia? 


Well, first of all, an 11% margin is very high in a democratic society, especially for an incumbent president. 2024 was the year of elections globally, and very few incumbents actually won. Maia Sandu made history by being the first Moldovan incumbent to win a second term by popular vote; Moldovan voters are very critical voters and usually punish the incumbent. Also to make it clear, even her opponent, Stoianoglo, was campaigning on a platform for European integration. He himself is an EU citizen, and a Romanian citizen, and is also advocating for Moldova joining the EU. In a way, at least on this issue, there was an agreement between the two candidates. I think Moldova, as I mentioned, has been a strong supporter of Ukraine and will continue to provide support to Ukraine and stand against the [Russian] aggression in defence of international law.


The Republic of Moldova is a neutral country, its Constitution prohibits joining military alliances, including NATO. There is no majority support for the country joining NATO and the current government is not pursuing this track.   


How has the situation in Transnistria, a de facto self-governing, partially ethnic Russian region along Moldova’s Ukrainian border, evolved since the War in Ukraine began? What implications does Transnistria have for European security and Ukraine’s war effort? 


The Transnistrian region is not populated by a majority of Russians. It is equally divided between Romanian speakers, Ukrainians, and Russians. There are two elements that make Transnistria a potential security threat. One is the stationing of Russian troops in Transnistria. There are still about 1,300 Russian troops in that region, just imagine they are in the ‘backyard’ of Ukraine.


Second is the substantial stockpile of ammunition and weapons that is still present in the Transnistria region that is unaccounted for. Those two elements create a potential security threat, especially for Ukraine. Otherwise, the situation remains stable. The dialogue between Chișinǎu and the de facto authorities in the Transnistrian region continues and has continued in the 1+1 format because the 5+2 format has been paused for a while because Russia and Ukraine, being the two mediators, are not able to sit at the same table. But the dialogue continues, including regarding the supply of energy to the Transnistrian region in the winter season. 


Moldova voted to amend its constitution to allow it to potentially join the EU in the 2024 Referendum by a narrow margin of under 1%. One potential roadblock to eventual accession is Transnistria’s reliance on Russian energy. How has Moldova tried to move them or itself away from Russian energy, if it has, and has it been successful in these efforts? Alternatively, has Transnistria used its ability to potentially stifle accession as leverage in any way? 


VU: The referendum that just passed in October was about amending the constitution to enshrine European integration as the objective, as a mandate for future governments. It was not a vote on joining the EU yet, that will come after finalizing negotiations with the EU. When it comes to specifically the energy situation, back in the Winter of 2022, Russia cut in half the gas supply to Moldova, despite the existence of a long-term contract for supplying gas to Moldova. At that point, the Moldovan authorities decided that all the gas that came from Russia would be supplied to the Transnistrian region, while the rest of Moldova shifted very quickly to buying gas from the European market. So, over the last 2 years, Moldova has ‘gained its independence’ from Russia and can supply itself with gas from the European market. Similar to the Transnistrian region, as soon as Russian gas stops transiting Ukraine, Moldova can supply the Transnistria region with gas bought on the European market. 


Alternatively, Russia can also continue supplying its gas to Transnistria through Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania, and Moldovan authorities would not object to this and would be eager to provide any technical support to allow that flow into the Transnistria region. Unfortunately, Russia does not seem to want to supply its gas to the Transnistrian region and is transforming this situation into an artificial crisis. This is a very typical way of Russia weaponizing energy and blackmailing Moldovan authorities to try to influence the 2025 parliamentary elections in Moldova in some way. 


How do you believe Transnistria, and the presence of Russian troops in the breakaway region, could impact Moldova’s accession to the EU and NATO? 


Moldova, under its current constitution adopted in 1994 doesn’t allow the stationing of foreign troops on its territory. This clause also disallows Moldovan authorities from seeking membership in any military alliance, including NATO. Moldova’s ambition is to join the EU by 2030, meaning completing the negotiations and going through the ratification process, but it is not seeking NATO membership. The only country that does not respect Moldova’s neutrality is actually Russia because it continues to station its troops in the Transnistria region without the consent of the Moldovan government. We hope by the time Moldova joins the EU, that we settle and integrate the Transnistria region under the authority of the government in Chișinǎu.


The Transnistrian region has benefited a lot from our free trade agreement with the EU. 80% of Transnistrian exports go to the EU, and very little trade is actually happening between Transnistria and Russia. We hope that the people living in the Transnistrian region see the benefits of European integration and that as we move closer to the EU, they will feel the benefits for their prosperity as a result of EU membership. 


Beyond the Russian-speaking minority in the Transnistria breakaway region, Moldova also has a Turkic minority, the Gagauz, who support Russia. The Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia overwhelmingly voted for the Russia-leaning candidate in 2024, and over 95% of the region voted against changing the constitution to allow Moldova to join the EU. Given the evident anti-Western sentiment in this autonomous region, do you feel that eventual accession to the EU would further strain Moldovan-Gagauz relations, and how can the international community and the Romanian-speaking majority in Moldova better engage the Gagauz to mitigate that potential strain?


Commenting on the results of the referendum in Gagauzia, it was quite unusual for a candidate country to the EU to organize a referendum very early on when it is still at the beginning of negotiations. There was a very short period of campaigning for the referendum. I think that created a vulnerability that Russia exploited, especially in the Gagauz region. We’ve seen during this campaign there was a lot of miscommunication, and information run in a very targeted manner by Russia, especially in the Gagauz region.


So I think one reason so many people voted against the EU option in Gagauzia was because of a misunderstanding of the benefits of the EU. Again, some of those misperceptions came from misinformation that Gagauzia depends very much on trade with Russia, which was false. The majority of trade and exports from the Gagauzia region are aimed toward the EU. Very little trade is happening with Russia. Most of the development projects implemented in Gagauzia are being funded by the EU and EU member states. I think with time, as we advance with negotiations and approach the date of accession, many of the Gagauz people realize the benefits of joining the EU and those perceptions will change.  


Do you think Moldova holding a referendum this early on was in part symbolic?


I think it was partially driven by the need to settle the dispute between the opposition and the ruling government about where people see their future. The call for a referendum was actually initially a call from the opposition parties, which then the president set in motion. But again, it’s very unusual, most other countries that had a referendum to join the EU organized it after completing the negotiations and after many, many years of EU funding various projects in the aspiring country to increase the prosperity of the population, to increase trade between the aspiring country and the EU.


How do you believe Moldova, as an actor on the global stage, can better balance the interests of the Romanian-speaking majority and the sizable Russian minority? How can Moldova avoid alienating this minority as it works to improve economic and political cooperation with the West, the rest of Europe, and Romania?


Looking at the choices of people, I don’t think there’s a big divide between the Romanian-speaking population being more pro-EU and the Russian-speaking population being more pro-Russian. Speaking about my friends and family, some of whom are Russian speakers, they are huge supporters of Moldova joining the EU. It’s all about the information space they live in and the information sources of people. I believe if the Moldovan people would have more reliable information about the tangible benefits of Moldova joining the EU we would see growing support for the European Union, irrespective of whether they are Romanian-speaking or Russian-speaking.


I think what the government and advocates of EU accession should be doing more of is explaining and providing more information and transparency about the negotiations and benefits that the EU can bring to different categories of people including trade and development projects. Hopefully, as we advance, we will see more of those projects being implemented in Moldova. The EU just committed $1.8 billion Euros for Moldovan economic development in the next 3 years and that will provide a huge boost to the development of the infrastructure that everybody will see.  


You are also Moldova’s ambassador to Mexico. How would you assess the partnerships between Mexico and Moldova? How has Moldova engaged with Mexico politically and economically, and how do you believe the new Sheinbaum administration will impact Moldova-Mexico relations? 


Moldovan-Mexican relations are durable, and are primarily focused on developing trade. We saw some improvements in our exports to Mexico, and Moldova also continues to import many goods from Mexico. During my last trip to Mexico for the inauguration of the new president, I met people from the business community who created new trade links between the two countries.


I was very pleased to see Moldova being recognized in Mexico due to a big information campaign. There are huge billboards in Mexico City about Moldova and Moldovan wine. I was surprised to be in a Mexican restaurant and be able to order Moldovan wine. It was quite expensive though! Last year, a Mexican importer of Moldovan wines managed to break the market and now you can find Moldovan wines in some shops and restaurants in Mexico City. So that is probably going to be the focus of our relationship, and we hope to continue our political consultations next year and continue the cultural exchanges as well.   


President-Elect Trump has promised to end the Ukraine War. How will a peace deal in Ukraine, that will likely involve Ukraine ceding territory, impact Moldova's security? 


I think Moldova’s security will only improve by reaching a peace in Ukraine. Moldova has been a supporter of the Zelenskyy Plan for a just peace. I think what we want to see is a durable and just peace, not just a pause in military operations. Just a reminder, this war started in 2014, paused for many years and then restarted in 2022. I know that’s what Ukrainians want and I think a durable peace agreement in Ukraine will make Moldovans feel most secure. Only Ukrainians can decide what makes peace just, and what are the security guarantees that other countries could provide to Ukraine to make sure that this war actually stops and doesn't repeat itself. So we will be supporting whatever the Ukrainian authorities and the Ukrainian people think is a fair deal. 



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